Policy Papers
Chinese military modernization over the past 25 years, marked by a 790% rise in defense spending, has transformed the PLA into a leading global force and reshaped the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. This modernization, combined with assertive PLA behavior, has increased the frequency and danger of military encounters in the region, raising the risk of miscalculation and conflict. Through case studies of six regional actors, the report analyzes PLA escalation dynamics, shared threat perceptions, regional responses, and implications for deterrence.
Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation Through Semiconductors (Hoover Institution Press, July 2023)
In a contribution to Hoover Institution Press' Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security, Kharis Templeman and Dr. Mastro discuss how Washington and Taipei can deepen cooperation on semiconductor issues. A shared demand for and interest in semiconductor technology provide many opportunities for improving ties. This, in turn, can help strengthen deterrence against Beijing's potential attempts to invade Taiwan.
Oriana Skylar Mastro’s chapter in CSIS' Project Atom 2023 argues that China’s nuclear buildup does not indicate a shift in its core nuclear policy. Beijing is likely to maintain its no-first-use stance and focus on assured retaliation. The buildup is driven by concerns over U.S. missile defense advancements undermining China’s second-strike capability, not a pursuit of nuclear parity.
The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China (Hoover Institution Press, November 2023)
In her chapter for Hoover Institution Press's "Defense Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak," Oriana Skylar Mastro lays out Chinese activities and capabilities with respect to a Taiwan contingency as well as US challenges in countering (and thus deterring) China. The increase in resources and effort has resulted in more frequent, sophisticated, and multifaceted PLA presence and activities in the region and beyond, undermining faith in the US’s willingness to live up to its defense commitments. She presents a series of recommendations to mitigate US defense challenges in deterring China from attempting a fait accompli.
Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific (Asia Policy, October 2022)
In an Asian Policy roundtable, Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the role of the Quad and other minilateral groupings in deterring Chinese aggression. As China’s military might grows, the United States and its allies are increasingly concerned with deterrence. Their strategies seek to prevent Beijing from disrupting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by, for example, invading Taiwan or conducting gray-zone operations in the South China Sea. This essay lays out some of the unique characteristics of the China challenge before considering how minilaterals can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances.
How South Korea Can Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan (The Washington Quarterly, October 2022)
This article, co-authored with Sungmin Cho, looks into how South Korea might support a US-led effort to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. While fighting side-by-side with the United States is likely politically infeasible in the ROK, the country can still provide valuable help to such an effort. First, the South Korean military could shoulder more of the burden in deterring North Korean aggression, allowing more US troops to defend Taiwan. Additionally, South Korea could provide rear-area support in such a contingency. Finally, the ROK might forge closer economic ties with Taiwan in order to deter a Chinese invasion in the first place.
Strait of Emergency? Debating Beijing’s Threat to Taiwan (Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021)
This article is a collection of critical responses to the prior The Taiwan Temptation piece published, concluded with a final reply by myself. To summarize, China is not the same country it was 70 years ago. It would be wishful thinking to assume that China has not also changed its thinking on Taiwan.
Chinese Intentions in the
South China Sea (Wilson Center, April 2021)
What are China’s intentions in the South China Sea? In this article, Oriana Skylar Mastro presents an analytical framework for understanding intentions based on: 1) distinguishing between intentions about the process and the outcome and 2) incorporating information from discourse, behavior, and capabilities.
This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.”
The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing May Resort to Force (Foreign Affairs, July/August 2021)
Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the first time in three decades, it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could soon use force to end its almost century-long civil war. Support for armed unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing.
What are the key trends in the conventional military balance between China and India? This chapter addresses how each country’s military forces are postured, and examines each side’s military priorities, military modernization to date, local military balance, and the implications of these factors.
During the past eight months of the global COVID pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea. Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that the greatest change in the PLA’s role in the South China Sea has not been operational. The PLA has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but a more aggressive one.
The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions (Foreign Affairs, January-February 2019)
Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific , China wants total dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon.
How has China historically approached diplomacy, mediation and escalation in conflict? To what degree are these historical patterns of behavior likely to manifest themselves in future conflicts, especially given all the changes to China’s internal and external environment since China’s last war in 1979?
What are the long-term implications of strategic competition with China, particularly in military aviation? How does our platform development compare? Employment concepts? Personnel and training?
.jpg)
The conventional wisdom on what China would do if conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula is dangerously out of date. Oriana Skylar Mastro argues China is likely to intervene militarily and extensively not in support of North Korea, but to protect its national interests.
Ideas, Perceptions, and Power: An Examination of China's Military Strategy (Strategic Asia, 2017-18)
This chapter explains how a broad base of national power, the prevalence of perceived maritime threats, and national narratives about the “century of humiliation” and Chinese exceptionalism combine to make regional power projection the most attractive national military strategy to Chinese leaders.
Risk and Resiliency: China's Emerging Air Base Strike Threat (Project 2049, November 2017)
This paper, written with Project 2049’s Ian Easton, seeks to provide an overview of the evolving airpower challenge that the United States faces in the Western Pacific. The authors explore Chinese military writings on air base strike operations, and then evaluate the current trajectory of the PLA’s precision strike capabilities.
This brief evaluates US and Chinese military aviation through three factors that shed light on the degree and nature of strategic competition: resource allocations, targeted platform development, and airpower employment concepts.
Dynamic Dilemmas: China's Evolving Northeast Asia Security (Korea Economic Institute, 2016)
What are Chinese strategic intentions in Northeast Asia and how have they evolved in recent years? Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that Northeast Asia is the foundation of China’s strategy to facilitate its rise, keep Japan down, and eventually to keep the United States out.
A Global Expeditionary People's Liberation Army, 2025-2030 (NBR/SSI, 2015)
This chapter assesses the changes to doctrine, strategic guidance, operational concepts, force posture, organization, training and logistics Beijing is likely to make if it moves to develop a global expeditionary PLA by 2025-2030.
The Problems with the Liberal Peace in Asia (Survival, April/May 2014)
The conviction that economic ties will engender peace is a lynchpin of US strategy, but Asian leaders view failure to protect territorial claims as worse than the losses associated with a limited war.
Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay (Washington Quarterly, January 2014)
The article discusses the roles of coercion and assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that increased levels of assertiveness are likely to persist because Chinese officials see the strategy as beneficial and central to China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
China's Antiaccess-Area Denial (A2/AD) Capabilities: Is the Rebalancing Enough? (CENSA, 2014)
What are the major components of China’s A2/AD approach and how does the U.S. rebalancing address these challenges? Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that China’s active defense strategy can be as four pillars: kinetic, geographic, political and deterrent, and present three balancing acts the United States must master if it is to counter China.
Noninterference in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy: Fact or Fiction? (Praeger, 2014)
What is the contemporary role and interpretation of the noninterference principle in Chinese foreign policy, and how has it evolved historically? Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that the principle is evolving to allow more flexibility, largely because of external pressures.
China Can't Stay Home (The National Interest, November/December 2014)
While the Chinese leadership would prefer to stay focused on internal development and regional issues, facts on the ground like the need to protect commercial interests and Chinese citizens abroad will increasingly compel the CCP to develop some global operational power-projection capabilities.