Upstart

How China Became a Great Power

*Appendix: China’s Peacekeeping Operations Missions*

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**Chinese PKO Missions**[[1]](#endnote-1)

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **UN Mission and Location** | **Year/s** | **Chinese Peacekeeping Involvement** | **Chinese Economic Interests** |
| Observer Mission in Sierra Leona (UNOMSIL) | 1998-1999 | Military observers |  |
| Mission in Sierra Leona (UNAMSIL) | 1999-2005 | Military observers |  |
| Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) | 2000-2008 | Military observers | Significant Ethiopian construction contracts, including hydroelectric and other power generation |
| Operation in Burundi (ONUB) | 2004-2007 | Military observers |  |
| Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) | 1999-2010 | Combat unit — 218 troopsMilitary observers | Construction contracts, including to China Railway Engineering and Sinohydro, in the hundreds of millions of USD |
| Mission in Sudan (MIS) | 2005-2011 | Military observers | Significant investment by Sinohydro, China Three Gorges, as well the China National Petroleum Corporation |
| Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) | 2004-2017 | Military observers |  |
| Mission in Liberia (UMIL) | 2003-2018 | Engineer unit — 275 troopsTransport unit — 240 troopsMedical unit — 43 troops | Major infrastructure projects, including roads, airports, and oil storage[[2]](#endnote-2)China-Union Investment Bong Mines company invested 2.6 billion USD in oil and gas drilling |
| Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) | 2007-2020 | Engineer unit — 315 troopsHelicopter unit — 140 troops | Same as Sudan above |
| Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) | 2004-2017 | Police unit — 143 troops | Haiti is one of the few remaining countries with diplomatic ties to the ROC on Taiwan instead of the PRC — China has continuously courted these nations to whittle away at Taiwanese sovereign legitimacy |
| Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) | 2006-2012 | Police unit — 21 troops | China was the first country to recognize Timor Leste’s sovereigntyAllows China to expand influence in Southeast Asia, restrict and encircle TaiwanChinese companies have significant oil contracts, including two heavy oil power plants[[3]](#endnote-3) |
| Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) | 1991-present | Military observers | China’s CITIC Construction agreed in 2018 to build a 6 billion USD phosphate production facility, for fertilizers[[4]](#endnote-4) |
| Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) | 2010-present | Engineer unit — 175 troopsMedical unit — 43 troops | Around 5 billion USD investment by China Molybdenum Company in Congolese cobalt and rare earth mineral sector[[5]](#endnote-5)Important for high tech supply chains, electric vehicle batteries |
| Interim Security Force for Abyei — Sudan (UNISFA) | 2011-present | Military observers | Sudan used to be China’s 6th largest oil source — when South Sudan split, it took 80% of oil reserves |
| Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) | 2011-present | Engineer unit — 275 troopsTransport unit — 100 troopsMedical unit — 60 troopsInfantry battalion — 700 troops | China National Petroleum Corporation has significant investments in South Sudanese oil sectorAlso helps protect from conflict spillover into neighboring Belt and Road states which also host significant Chinese investment, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia[[6]](#endnote-6) |
| Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) | 2013-present | Engineer unit — 155 troopsMedical unit — 70 troopsForce protection unit — 170 troops | Significant infrastructure projects including 8 billion USD railway as well as schools, clinics, and bridgesMany previous Chinese investment projects have been destroyed by insurgents[[7]](#endnote-7) |
| Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) | 1964-present | Police unit – 6 troops[[8]](#endnote-8)observers | 2021 announcement of Chinese and Cyprus strategic partnership and joint partners in BRI[[9]](#endnote-9) |
| Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) | 1999-present | Police unit — 18 troops | Attempted bidding on certain power plants and road infrastructure projects — mostly unsuccessful/nonexistent[[10]](#endnote-10) |
| Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) | 1978-present | Engineer unit — 475 troopsMedical unit — 60 troops | Lebanon has a $146 million trade deficit with China[[11]](#endnote-11)China has also committed 2 billion USD to reconstruction efforts and loans offered for power generation[[12]](#endnote-12) |

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